

# Some Easy Instances of Ideal-SVP and Implications on the Partial Vandermonde Knapsack Problem

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# Frozen Lake of the Shortest Vector Problem



# Frozen Lake of the Shortest Vector Problem **Over Ideals**

[PXWC21, PML21]

[CDPR16]

[CDW21]

# Frozen Lake of the Shortest Vector Problem **Over Ideals**

?

[PXWC21, PML21]




[CDPR16]



[CDW21]

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[CDPR16]




[PXWC21, PML21]  
**Our Work**



[CDW21]

# Where To Put Partial Vandermonde Knapsack?




# Where To Put Partial Vandermonde Knapsack?





# Where To Put Partial Vandermonde Knapsack?



1. Some Easy Instances of Ideal-SVP
2. Implications on Partial Vandermonde Knapsack
3. Implications to Cryptography

# Lattices

An **Euclidean lattice**  $\Lambda$  of rank  $d$  with a basis  $B = (b_j)_{1 \leq j \leq d}$  is given by

$$\Lambda(B) = \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^d z_j b_j : z_j \in \mathbb{Z} \right\}.$$


The **minimum** of  $\Lambda$  is

$$\lambda_1(\Lambda) := \min_{v \in \Lambda \setminus \{0\}} \|v\|.$$

The **approximate shortest vector problem** ( $\text{SVP}_\gamma$ ) for  $\gamma \geq 1$  asks to find a vector  $w$  such that  $\|w\| \leq \gamma \lambda_1(\Lambda)$ .

## Conjecture:

There is no polynomial-time algorithm that solves  $\text{SVP}_\gamma$  for  $\gamma$  polynomial in  $d$ .



# Module and Ideal Lattices

Number field  $K$  of **degree**  $d$  with  $O_K$  its ring of integers

Canonical embedding  $\sigma: K \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^d$

Number Theory

$M \subset (O_K)^r$  module of **rank**  $r$   $\rightarrow$

$I \subset O_K$  ideal ( $r = 1$ )  $\rightarrow$


Geometry

$\sigma(M) \subset \mathbb{R}^{d \cdot r}$  module lattice

$\sigma(I) \subset \mathbb{R}^d$  ideal lattice

Mod-SVP $_\gamma$  is SVP $_\gamma$  restricted to module lattices

Id-SVP $_\gamma$  is SVP $_\gamma$  restricted to ideal lattices

  
hardness assumption  
of practical  
lattice-based cryptography

## Question

*Is Mod-SVP and/or Id-SVP easier than SVP on all Euclidean lattices?*

**This paper:** focus on Id-SVP for **specific** ideals

# Polynomial-Time Solver for Specific Id-SVP $_{\gamma}$

Work	Type	Field	Ideal	Approx. $\gamma$
[CDPR16]	quantum	cyclotomic	principal (Gaussian generator)	all
[CDW21]	quantum	cyclotomic	all	$\geq 2\sqrt{d}$
[PXWC21]	classic	Galois	A : prime, symmetries	$\sqrt{d}$
[PML21]	classic	Galois	B : all*, symmetries	complex**
<b>This work</b>	classic	all	C : all*, symmetries	$\geq 2\sqrt{d}$

- $A \cup B + \text{poly-}\gamma \subsetneq C$  (easy PV-Knap is only in  $C$ )
- Membership in  $C$  can be easily checked (not true for  $B + \text{poly-}\gamma$ )
- all\*: all ideals whose prime factors are not ramified (all but finitely many)
- complex\*\*: depends on prime decomposition and norm of the ideal

# Main Result

Let  $K$  be a number field of degree  $d$  with automorphism group  $\text{Aut}_{\mathbb{Q}}(K)$ .  
For an ideal  $I$ , we define  $n_I = |\{\tau \in \text{Aut}_{\mathbb{Q}}(K) : \tau(I) = I\}| \in [1, d]$ .

## Theorem

*Let  $I$  be an ideal in  $K$  whose prime factors are not ramified. There is a classical algorithm that solves  $\text{Id-SVP}_{\gamma}$  in the ideal lattice  $I$  in time roughly*

$$\exp\left(\frac{d}{n_I \cdot \log \gamma}\right).$$

- if  $n_I = 1$ , then **exponential-time** algorithm (as for general (ideal) lattices)
- if  $n_I$  a fraction of  $d$ , then **polynomial-time** algorithm (many symmetries)
- $n_I$  easy to compute (given a basis of  $I$  and a description of  $\text{Aut}_{\mathbb{Q}}(K)$ )

# Technical Details

Let  $K$  be a number field of degree  $d$  with automorphism group  $\text{Aut}_{\mathbb{Q}}(K)$ .  
For an ideal  $I$ , define its

- decomposition group  $H_I := \{\tau \in \text{Aut}_{\mathbb{Q}}(K) : \tau(I) = I\}$  ( $n_I = |H_I|$ )
- decomposition field  $K_I := \{x \in K : \tau(x) = x, \forall \tau \in H_I\}$  (fixed field of  $H_I$ )

## Lemma

*Let  $I$  be an ideal in  $K$  whose prime factors are not ramified. Then it holds that*

$$I = (I \cap K_I) \cdot \mathcal{O}_K.$$

Intuitively:

- Short vectors of  $I$  are also contained in  $I \cap K_I$
- The larger  $H_I \Rightarrow$  the smaller  $K_I \Rightarrow$  the easier it is to find short vectors

# Implications on the Partial Vandermonde Knapsack Problem



# Partial Vandermonde Knapsack (Partial Fourier Recovery)

- Number field  $K$  of degree  $d$  with  $O_K$  its ring of integers
- Prime  $q$  such that  $qO_K = \prod_{j=1}^d \mathfrak{p}_j$ , where  $\mathfrak{p}_j$  is prime ideal of norm  $q$
- For  $\Omega \subseteq \{1, \dots, d\}$ , define  $\mathfrak{l}_\Omega := \prod_{j \in \Omega} \mathfrak{p}_j$

## Definition (PV-Knap $_\psi$ )

Given  $\mathfrak{l}_\Omega$  as above and let  $\psi$  be a distribution over  $O_K$  sampling short ring elements. Given  $t = e \bmod \mathfrak{l}_\Omega$ , for  $e \leftarrow \psi$ , the partial Vandermonde knapsack problem asks to find  $e \in \text{supp}(\psi)$ .

Choice of  $\Omega$ :

- [HPS<sup>+</sup>14, HS15, DHSS20] don't specify how to choose  $\Omega$  (and fix it)
- [LZA18, BSS22] sample  $\Omega$  uniformly at random

# Concrete Example

- $K = \mathbb{Q}[x]/\langle x^2 + 1 \rangle$  and  $O_K = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\langle x^2 + 1 \rangle$ , i.e.,  $d = 2$
- $q = 17$
- $x^2 + 1 = (x - 4)(x - 13) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$
- primitive roots are 4 and 13
- $qO_K = \mathfrak{p}_1 \cdot \mathfrak{p}_2$  with  $\mathfrak{p}_1 = \langle q, x - 4 \rangle$  and  $\mathfrak{p}_2 = \langle q, x - 13 \rangle$
- Take  $\Omega = \{1\}$ , i.e.,  $I_\Omega = \mathfrak{p}_1$
- $\psi = \text{Unif}(\{ax + b : a, b \in \{-1, 0, 1\}\})$
- For  $e \leftarrow \psi$  it yields  $e \bmod I_\Omega = e(4) \bmod q$

*Modulo  $I_\Omega$  equals evaluating at the corresponding primitive roots modulo  $q$*

# PV Knap as Ideal Lattice Problem

Number field  $K$  of degree  $d$  and canonical embedding  $\sigma: K \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^d$

## Definition (Id-BDD $_{\delta}$ )

Let  $I$  be an ideal in  $O_K$ . Given  $t \in \mathbb{R}^d$  such that  $t = v + e$ , with  $v \in \sigma(I)$  and

$$\|e\| \leq \delta,$$

the **approximate bounded distance decoding** problem over **ideal lattices** (Id-BDD $_{\delta}$ ) asks to find  $e$  (or  $v$ ).

Assume that  $\psi$  is  $\delta$ -bounded distribution over  $O_K$

Instance of PV-Knap $_{\psi} \Rightarrow$  instance of Id-BDD $_{\delta}$  for the ideal  $I_{\Omega}$  with

$$t = e \bmod I_{\Omega} = v + e,$$

where  $v \in \sigma(I_{\Omega})$  and  $\|e\| \leq \delta$ .

# Missing Puzzle Piece

## Lemma (Simplified)

*Let  $I$  be an ideal of  $K$ . There is an efficient reduction from  $\text{Id-BDD}_\delta$  in  $I$  to  $\text{Id-SVP}_\gamma$  in  $I'$ , where  $\delta$  and  $\gamma$  are quite close.*

- Simplified a lot
- Standard techniques
- $K$  power-of-two cyclotomic:  $\delta > 2\gamma$
- $I'$  has symmetries  $\Leftrightarrow I$  has symmetries
- For more details: [ia.cr/2022/709](https://ia.cr/2022/709)

# Bad Choices of $\Omega$

**Idea:** If we can solve Id-SVP on  $I_\Omega$ , we can solve PV-Knap on  $I_\Omega$

**Question:** When does  $I_\Omega$  have many symmetries?

**Strategy:** Construct **specific**  $I_\Omega$  that is fixed by many automorphisms of  $K$

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**Idea:** If we can solve Id-SVP on  $I_\Omega$ , we can solve PV-Knap on  $I_\Omega$

**Question:** When does  $I_\Omega$  have many symmetries?

**Strategy:** Construct **specific**  $I_\Omega$  that is fixed by many automorphisms of  $K$

- Fix one prime ideal  $\mathfrak{p}$  of the factorization of  $qO_K = \prod_{i=1}^d \mathfrak{p}_i$
- Let  $H$  be a subgroup of  $Aut_{\mathbb{Q}}(K)$
- It defines  $\Omega_H \subseteq \{1, \dots, d\}$  such that  $\{\tau(\mathfrak{p}) : \tau \in H\} = \{\mathfrak{p}_i : i \in \Omega_H\}$

Hence, the ideal

$$I_{\Omega_H} = \prod_{i \in \Omega_H} \mathfrak{p}_i = \prod_{\tau \in H} \tau(\mathfrak{p})$$

is fixed by  $H$ .

**Example:** For  $K$  power-of-two cyclotomic of **degree**  $d$ , it exists  $H$  of size  $d/2$ .

# Experimental Results

- Scenario 1: **worst-case**  $\Omega$ 
  - ▶  $\Omega$  chosen such that  $I_\Omega$  stable by many automorphisms
  - ▶ Parameter sets from the literature [HPS<sup>+</sup>14, LZA18]
  - ▶ Solve PV-Knap in few minutes, even seconds
  
- Scenario 2: **average-case**  $\Omega$ 
  - ▶  $\Omega$  chosen uniformly at random
  - ▶ Only distinguishing attacks
  - ▶ Strategy: forget some indices in the set  $\Omega$
  - ▶ Trade-off: problem gets harder, but we might gain symmetries
  - ▶ With non-negligible probability lattice dimension is reduced by factor 2
  - ▶ 128-bit security claimed by [LZA18] drops to 87-bit security (against distinguishing attacks)

# Implications to Cryptography



# Guidelines for using $\text{Id-SVP}_\gamma$ in Cryptography

- 1 Check if rank can be increased from 1 to 2 (aka rely on  $\text{Mod-SVP}_\gamma$  instead)
- 2 If not, use random ideals sampled from a distribution that is supported by [worst-to-average case](#) reductions [Gen09, dBDPW20]
- 3 If not, avoid known 'bad' ideals, i.e.,
  - ▶ principal ideal with Gaussian generator in cyclotomic fields [CDPR16]
  - ▶ ideals fixed by some non-trivial automorphism of the field [[this work](#)]
- 4 In any case, do not rely on the hardness of  $\text{Id-SVP}_\gamma$  for  $\gamma \geq 2^{\sqrt{d}}$ , where  $d$  is the degree of the number field (if it is cyclotomic) [CDW21]

# Implications to PV-Knap-Based Cryptography

- Our results lead to
    - ▶ secret key recovery attacks against **PASS Sign** [HPS<sup>+</sup>14, LZA18]
    - ▶ secret key recovery attacks against **PASS Encrypt** [HS15, BSS22]
    - ▶ forgery attacks against (candidate) aggregate signature **MMSA(TK)** [DHSS20]
- only for** specific design choices of  $\Omega$
- For random  $\Omega$ , the attack lattice dimension is decreased by a factor 2
  - Can be mitigated by increasing the parameters

# Implications to Lattice-Based Cryptography

- Our algorithm solves **specific** instances of Id-SVP
- Having many symmetries is a **strong** requirement
- No implications to the hardness of structured problems such as Ring-SIS or Ring-LWE, as they are based on **worst-case** hardness of Id-SVP
- Reductions are only proven in one direction
- No implications to the hardness of Module-LWE (Dilithium, Kyber)

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Thank you.





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